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I.
INTRODUCTION
At seven years old, Maria Isabel Bueso arrived in the United
States from Guatemala to participate in a clinical trial at the request
of doctors researching Mucopolysaccharidosis VI (MPS-6)—an
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uncommon and debilitating genetic disease.1 With complications
from dwarfism, blurred vision, and spinal cord compression, Bueso
was not expected to live beyond the age of twenty.2 The rarity of the
disease also made Bueso’s participation all the more necessary as
doctors struggled with trial enrollment.3 Yet, with Bueso’s help,
doctors were able to gain FDA approval for a new medication that
extended her life span by more than ten years.4 Today, at twentyfour years old, Bueso has been recognized for her advocacy by local
and national legislators and is receiving ongoing treatment through
her parents’ private insurance.5
At thirty-three years old, M.K. contemplates the impossibility of
leaving the tenth floor of a Boston hospital, where he receives treatment for a rare vascular tumor.6 A software engineer from Morocco,
M.K. came to the United States as a place of last resort after being
denied operation in Belgium, Germany, and South Korea.7 He
turned to Boston after discovering two doctors who would treat him,
arriving on a tourist and medical visa in 2017.8 With his authorized
stay expiring, M.K. applied for medical deferred action—an alternate grounds for permitting him to stay in the United States for treatment.9
For Bueso, M.K., and countless others, the United States’ discretionary program granting medical deferred action to immigrants
demonstrating extreme medical need has been a godsend. Where relief is often not accessible within their own native countries, foreign
nationals have been granted authorization to remain in the United

1
Miriam Jordan & Caitlin Dickerson, Sick Migrants Undergoing Lifesaving
Care Can Now Be Deported, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/29/us/immigrant-medical-treatment-deferred-action.html.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Shannon Dooling, As Feds Reopen Some Medical Deferral Cases, Boston
Patients
Find
Hope,
WBUR
NEWS
(Sept.
4,
2019),
https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/09/04/boston-migrants-react-medical-deferralaction-change.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
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States regardless of their status.10 However, when news broke on
August 7, 2019, that U.S. Customs and Immigration Services
(USCIS) would no longer review medical deferred action applications, the lives of many beneficiaries were put into question.11 With
little fanfare, USCIS denied and deferred applications to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—the agency charged with deportation.12
For beneficiaries like M.K., the life-altering news came from the
media first: “‘What happen[ed] is I read your article before I even
saw the letter, and I called a family member to check out the mail
and surprise, surprise, there’s the letter.’”13 The implications were
clear. With deportations imminent, the risk of death was essentially
guaranteed. According to Arizona-based immigration attorney Jonathan Solorzano, deferral of one of his client’s applications to ICE
resulted in a denial and deportation.14 Solorzano’s client suffered
from a severe heart condition that rendered him immobile after several surgeries; yet, even with a letter from his cardiologist declaring
that a return to Mexico would invariably lead to his death, ICE deported him.15 A few weeks later, Solorzano’s client died.16
After much criticism, on September 19, 2019, USCIS announced it would continue reviewing applications for medical deferred action.17 Notwithstanding the change in course, the program’s
hiatus caused much confusion and led commentators to speculate as
to a discriminatory motive behind the policy change. 18 Termination
of medical deferred action—a small but longstanding program primarily benefiting non-white, non-European immigrants—raises

10
See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/archive/frequently-asked-questions (last updated Mar. 8,
2018).
11
See Madeline Ackley, Potential Deportation of Medically Vulnerable
Migrants Halted, but Questions Remain, CRONKITE NEWS ARIZ. PBS (Sept. 26,
2019) https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/2019/09/26/medical-deferred-action/.
12
Id.
13
Dooling, supra note 6.
14
Ackley, supra note 11.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
See id.
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questions as to the equal protection violations experienced by beneficiaries threatened with deportation.
Part I of this Note provides background on the origins and practice of medical deferred action. It also references analogous immigration policies whose implementation or threatened cancellation
have been challenged in the courts. Part II identifies the standard for
an equal protection challenge, pinpointing the presence of disparate
impact and discriminatory intent behind the Trump Administration’s temporary cancellation of medical deferred action. Finally,
Part III addresses how courts should proceed in analyzing a medical
deferred action equal protection challenge and the implications of
relying upon a discretionary, impermanent program.
II.

ROLLBACK OF MEDICAL DEFERRED ACTION AND
ANALOGOUS IMMIGRATION POLICIES
A.

Background on Medical Deferred Action
The practice of deferred action long predates the widely publicized Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy, or DACA,
first introduced by the Obama administration in November 2014.19
The action originates from the use of prosecutorial judgment in prioritizing certain deportation proceedings over others20 and is defined
as “a discretionary determination to defer a removal action of an individual as an act of prosecutorial discretion” according to U.S. Customs and Immigration Services.21 Government regulations have
deemed it “an act of administrative convenience to the government
which gives some cases lower priority.”22 Though a grant of deferred action does not bestow lawful status, an individual is considered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to be lawfully
present during the duration of the an authorized stay.23 In other

Deferred Action Basics, NATI’L IMMIGR. F. (Apr. 15, 2016), https://immigrationforum.org/article/deferred-action-basics/.
20
Id.
21
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10.
22
Complaint at 6, Irish Int’l Immigrant Ctr., Inc. v. Cuccinelli, (D. Mass.
2019) (No. 1:19-cv-11880-IT) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14)).
23
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10.
19
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words, USCIS will not pursue removal proceedings against those
present by way of deferred action.24
Deferred action stemmed from a practice of the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), DHS’s predecessor,
in which low priority was given to undocumented immigrants who
demonstrated extreme hardship upon leaving the United States.25
Such individuals are known as “non-priority aliens” and would essentially be given a pass on active deportation proceedings under an
unacknowledged INS practice.26 This non-priority status evolved
into the use of deferred action on an ad hoc basis and a discretionary
relief basis toward specific groups of undocumented immigrants.27
Pertinent here is the ad hoc basis for deferred action typically
granted to individuals for humanitarian purposes, such as caring for
a family member with serious mental or physical illness or obtaining
medical assistance for a serious mental or physical illness.28 Also
known as medical deferred action or non-military deferred action,
the program grants deferrals from deportation for a two-year period
to undocumented immigrants who show extreme medical need, such
as cancer, cystic fibrosis, HIV, cerebral palsy, muscular dystrophy,
or epilepsy.29
Determinations are made on a case-by-case basis in light of the
totality of the circumstances and use a similar analysis as that employed when considering B-2 visas filed for medical purposes.30 The
requests are seemingly administered under USCIS’s 2012 “Standard
Operating Procedures for Handling Deferred Action Requests at
USCIS Field Offices” for “all requests for deferred action . . . handled at USCIS Field Offices.”31 After years of practice, the
24

Deferred Action Basics, supra note 19.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Shannon Dooling, Trump Administration Ends Protection for Migrants’
Medical
Care,
NPR
(Aug.
27,
2019,
7:39
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/27/754634022/trump-administration-ends-protection-for-migrants-medical-care.
30
USCIS Re-Opens Previously Pending Deferral Requests, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-re-opens-previouslypending-deferral-requests (last updated Sept. 2, 2019).
31
Complaint, supra note 22, at 7-8 (citing U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.,
Standard Operating Procedures for Handling Deferred Action Requests at USCIS
25
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applications have undergone a uniform procedure for processing
with individualized determinations for responses.32 Once submitted
to the local USCIS field office, the application is assessed by a Field
Office Director and/or District Director and is ultimately decided by
a USCIS Regional Director.33 Signing as verification of the enclosed
content, applicants are expected to provide medical and supporting
documents such as “proof of identity and nationality, biographic information, ‘medical information, evidence of community and familial ties and equities, conditions in the requestor’s county of origin,
etc.’”34 They are also expected to submit fingerprints and are subjected to a series of background checks completed by USCIS before
approval.35
Upon approval, not only are deportation proceedings stayed, but
immigrants granted deferred action can seek work authorization and
a driver’s license.36 Because of the stay, rather than amassing unlawful presence, recipients retain the possibility of receiving future
immigration benefits that would have otherwise been barred under
8 U.S.C. section 1182(a)(9)(B)(i).37 Other available aid includes Social Security, retirement, and disability benefits, and depending on
the state, unemployment insurance.38 Overall, the program offers
mobility, stability, and relief to sick migrants and their respective
family members while receiving life-saving treatment.39
However, on August 7, 2019, medical deferred action was
placed on a temporary hiatus.40 On that day, USCIS purportedly
stopped processing deferral requests and pawned the responsibility
onto Immigration and Customs Enforcement—a shift of duty that
Field Offices 3 n.1 (Mar. 7, 2012) [hereinafter USCIS Standard Operating Procedures]).
32
See id. at 8.
33
Id.
34
Id. (citing USCIS Standard Operating Procedures at 3).
35
Id. (citing USCIS Standard Operating Procedures at 4-6).
36
Monique O. Madan & Ben Conarck, Undocumented Immigrants with Serious Illnesses Had a Lifeline. Now It May Be Gone, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 27,
2019,
8:13
AM),
www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article234426937.html.
37
Complaint, supra note 22, at 7.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Ackley, supra note 11.

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

137

implied full execution of deportation proceedings.41 Though the revocation was implemented as of August 7, USCIS did not publicly
announce the change, resulting in a delay in notification to the public
and ICE.42 In fact, ICE declined to take over the program and denied
knowledge of USCIS’s plan to discontinue the program.43
The delay in notice also affected immigrants applying for medical deferred action, who received letters that they were “not authorized to remain in the United States”; rather, they were told they had
thirty-three days to voluntarily leave or await possible forced removal.44 During this time, people were left in a state of confusion
regarding their status and their ability to retain treatment; further,
doctors noted that thirty-three days was insufficient time to transfer
the patient.45
Criticism grew from the medical community and Congress on
what effectively amounted to a death sentence since some of the required equipment, such as breathing and feeding tubes, are sparse to
nonexistent in some of the patients’ home countries.46 On August
30, Congress delivered a letter to DHS, USCIS, and ICE backed by
nearly 130 congressional signatories demanding answers and the reversal of “[yet] another cruel action by the Trump Administration to
attack our most vulnerable immigrant neighbors.”47 Congress gave
a deadline of September 13, 2019.48 Shortly thereafter, over a dozen
41

Id.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Letter from Michael J. McCleary, Field Office Dir., U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to [REDACTED] (Aug. 15,
2019),
https://d279m997dpfwgl.cloudfront.net/wp/2019/08/Redacted_MedDA_denials.pdf.
45
Priyanka Dayal McCluskey, ‘Deportation . . . With This Type of Medical
Condition is a Death Sentence’: Outrage Grows over Federal Policy Change,
BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 29, 2019, 8:25 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/08/29/deportation-from-united-states-with-this-typemedical-condition-death-sentence-representative-ayanna-pressleysaid/I2Fm6F5b85EKKdLMaLMi3M/story.html.
46
Id.
47
Letter from Congress, to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Secretary, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., Ken Cuccinelli, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Servs., & Matthew T. Albence, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t
(Aug.
30,
2019),
https://pressley.house.gov/sites/pressley.house.gov/files/083019%20Deferred%20Action%20Letter.pdf.
48
Id.
42

138

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:131

state attorney generals signed on to a letter to USCIS and ICE relaying concerns and questions on how medical deferral requests should
be made in the future.49 The House Subcommittee on Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties held an emergency hearing on September 12,
which despite an abundance of testimonial evidence from the victims, included little comment from USCIS regarding why the program ended and on whose orders.50 This lack of cooperation resulted
in a threat of subpoena from freshman Representative Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez.51
In the face of mounting outrage, USCIS announced on September 2 that it would limit reconsideration to applications pending as
of August 7 in a second attempt to phase out its role in medical deferred action cases.52 The announcement amounted to a staggering
791 pending petitions.53 Subsequently, on September 19, 2019, DHS
confirmed that deferred action petitions would be processed once
again by USCIS.54 Notably, petitions were instructed to be scrutinized and granted solely “on compelling facts and circumstances”55—a vague criterion.
Though the program’s termination only lasted for a month, 424
people received rejection letters out of the estimated 1,000 that apply yearly.56 In Massachusetts alone, an immigration attorney
49
Associated Press, Healey Among State Attorneys General Seeking Answers
On Immigrant Medical Care Cases, WBUR NEWS (Sept. 4, 2019),
https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/09/04/ag-maura-healey-medical-deferred-action.
50
Press Release, House Comm. on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee Examined Administration’s Decision to Deport Critically Ill Children During Emergency Hearing (Sept. 12, 2019), https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/subcommittee-examined-administration-s-decision-to-deport-critically-ill.
51
Id.
52
USCIS Re-Opens Previously Pending Deferral Requests, supra note 30.
53
Shannon Dooling, Congress Expected To Subpoena ICE, USCIS To Testify
In 2nd Hearing On Reinstated Medical Deferred Action, WBUR NEWS,
https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/10/11/medical-deferred-action-immigrationhearing-house (last updated Oct. 11, 2019).
54
Ackley, supra note 11.
55
Letter from Ken Cuccinelli, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigr.
Servs., to Jamie Raskin, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties, House of Rep. (Sept. 19, 2019), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/Chairman%20Raskin%20Letter.pdf [hereinafter
Letter from Ken Cuccinelli].
56
Ackley, supra note 11.
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calculated a group of roughly forty families that were affected and
estimated the potential for thousands to be affected nationally during
the program’s termination.57 Worse yet, as of October, families were
still awaiting news of approval or denial of their deferral applications.58
In the aftermath, concern stems not only from the month-long
turmoil that resulted from the policy change, but also from recent
trends of denying medical deferred action to those who are at risk of
dying upon deportation.59 The Trump Administration has focused
on violent offenders rather than the medically vulnerable, implementing a more rigid and less compassionate policy over the past
few years.60 As a consequence of the change in policy without public
notice, Congress is demanding transparency and investigating the
Trump Administration’s decision.61
The Trump Administration’s Muslim Ban
Unfortunately, the unannounced revocation of medical deferred
action is not the first time the Trump Administration has taken federal officials by surprise in changing immigration policy with limited notice.62 Taken together, it reflects a pattern of targeted
measures implemented to limit the flow of certain immigrants from
entering U.S. borders. Case in point, the first policy initiative issued
on January 27, 2017, concerned limiting the number of refugee petitions accepted and suspending for ninety days the admittance of
immigrants from countries predetermined as housing “terrorist
threats”—a policy infamously known as the Muslim Ban.63
Under the guise of “protect[ing] the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign nationals admitted to the United States,”
Executive Order 13769 held conditions such as warfare, disaster,
and civil disturbances under scrutiny in the name of safeguarding
U.S. national security.64 In addition to curbing the admittance of
B.

57

McCluskey, supra note 45.
Dooling, supra note 53.
59
See Ackley, supra note 11.
60
Id.
61
Dooling, supra note 53.
62
Jordan & Dickerson, supra note 1.
63
Id.
64
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
58
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refugees, it placed an automatic ninety-day suspension on the entry
of individuals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and
Yemen.65 Countries were chosen based on the following criteria:
[S]uspension applied to countries referred to in, or
designated under, section 217(a)(12) of the INA, 8
U.S.C. 1187(a)(12), in which Congress restricted use
of the Visa Waiver Program for nationals of, and aliens recently present in, (A) Iraq or Syria, (B) any
country designated by the Secretary of State as a state
sponsor of terrorism (currently Iran, Syria, and Sudan), and (C) any other country designated as a country of concern by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Director of National Intelligence.”66
In short, it deemed the entry of immigrants from countries in
strife to be extraordinarily suspect. The cited rationale was that the
agencies needed temporary reprieve from administrative burdens to
better utilize resources and adopt proper standards for screening foreign nationals.67 The price of administrative convenience, however,
meant sacrificing the safe harbor and welfare of refugees and foreign
nationals from Muslim-majority countries.
What began as one executive order snowballed into further executive action. Executive Order 13780 was announced in March
2017, superseding the first order.68 Its effect was to place travel limitations on Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, North Korea, and
Venezuela and to restrict entry by refugees lacking a visa or valid
travel documents.69 The document is itself aware of the protestations
of religious animus levied against its first iteration. Rather than ignore the outrage, however, it disputes it.70 Executive Order 13769
begins with a summary of its predecessor and tactfully mistakes the
controversy over religious favoritism as concern over prioritizing

65

Id.
Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017).
67
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
68
Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017).
69
Id.
70
See id.
66
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refugee petitions from persecuted religious minorities.71 More than
an attempt at appeasement, the acknowledgment shows the Trump
Administration’s attempt to prepare for anticipated litigation.
The order was followed by two revisions by way of Presidential
Proclamations 9645 and 9723.72 Presidential Proclamation 9645
was released on September 24, 2017, and notably added Chad,
North Korea, and Venezuela and removed Sudan from the travel restrictions list.73 More recently, in April 2018, Presidential Proclamation 9723 extended the ban on tourist and business visa applications from Libya and Yemen; banned some visas for Venezuelan
government officials; barred all but student and exchange visitor
visa applications from Iran; instituted a total ban on immigrant visa
applications from Somalia; and disallowed travel for North Korean
and Syrian foreign nationals.74 The latest change in 2020 saw the
addition of six new countries—Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Myanmar, Tanzania, and Sudan—leading to its additional characterization as an “African ban.”75
Despite the changes, the anticipated litigation came to pass. Following the first executive order, suits were hastily filed, and courts
around the country swiftly blocked implementation of the travel
ban.76 The second executive order was permitted to take partial effect after the Supreme Court decided to review appeals of lower
courts’ rulings blocking the ban.77 Upon its expiration, however, the
Supreme Court dismissed the appeals made by the Trump Administration.78
As the adage goes, the third time was the charm. With the delivery of Presidential Proclamation 9645 in September 2017, the debate
71

Id.
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 27, 2017); Proclamation
No. 9723, 83 Fed. Reg. 15937 (Apr. 13, 2018).
73
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 27, 2017).
74
Proclamation No. 9723, 83 Fed. Reg. 15937 (Apr. 13, 2018).
75
Sam Levin, ‘Trump is Deciding Who is American’: How the New Travel
Ban is Tearing Families Apart, GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2020, 6:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/feb/16/trump-is-deciding-who-isamerican-how-the-new-travel-ban-is-tearing-families-apart.
76
Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Trump’s Travel Ban is Upheld by Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/us/politics/supreme-court-trump-travel-ban.html.
77
Id.
78
Id.
72

142

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:131

over constitutionality reached the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii.79 The challenge was brought by the State of Hawaii, U.S. citizens and permanent residents with relatives seeking to apply for visas, and a Muslim non-profit organization.80 The suit objected to the
travel ban applied to the six Muslim-majority countries on the
grounds that the travel ban was based on religious animus with insufficient evidence of national security concerns.81 The challengers
won at the trial and appellate levels, where the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that the president abused the congressional
authority granted to the president over immigration and discriminated in issuing visas in violation of immigration laws.82
In a 5-4 split, the Supreme Court upheld the travel ban on the
determination that the president acted within the scope of his congressionally delegated power.83 The decision did not hinge on the
Establishment Clause claim of religious discrimination; instead, the
majority merely noted the president’s religiously inflammatory rhetoric as present but not dispositive.84 Greater focus was granted to
the presidential office in general with Chief Justice Roberts emphasizing that the concern was not over whether to denounce the president’s speech.85 Rather, the issue involved “the significance of those
statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face,
addressing a matter within the core of executive responsibility.86 In
doing so, [the Court] must consider not only the statements of a particular President, but also the authority of the Presidency itself.”87
As such, Chief Justice Roberts decided that the travel ban itself was
neutral and expressed a legitimate basis in promoting sufficient vetting of foreign nationals in accordance with U.S. national security.88

79

See id.
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
81
Id. at 2406.
82
Id. at 2406-07; see also Miriam Jordan, Appeals Court Rules Against Latest
Travel
Ban,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
22,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/22/us/travel-ban-court.html.
83
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2421.
84
See id. at 2417-24.
85
Id. at 2418.
86
Id. at 2401.
87
Id. at 2418.
88
Id. at 2421.
80
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Again, the decision was not unanimous, and a strong dissent indicated a reluctance by some justices to accept a purely, religiously
neutral basis for instituting a travel ban.89 In her scathing dissent,
Justice Sotomayor emphasized Trump’s unapologetic and continued
verbal attacks against the religion of Islam.90 She determined the
Trump Administration’s use of national security to be a guise or
laundered attempts by his attorneys to conceal the discriminatory
intent of the Proclamation.91 Turning to a recently decided case,
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018), she pointed out the Court’s folly—“the [real]
question [was] whether a government actor exhibited tolerance and
neutrality in reaching a decision that affects individuals’ fundamental religious freedom.”92 Though the Supreme Court upheld the
ban,93 there is still potential for a case turning on whether there was
neutral intent behind the decision rather than focusing on potential
presidential abuse of delegated authority.
C. Termination and Extension of TPS
Another revelation that came with the Trump Administration
was that Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations would also
be in jeopardy. Pursuant to 8 USCA section 1254a, the Attorney
General may grant lawful presence and work authorization to qualifying foreign nationals under temporary protected status.94 In practice, it is the Secretary of Homeland Security that “designate[s] a
foreign country for TPS due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from returning safely, or in
certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately.”95 TPS designations are typically
considered for countries with “[o]ngoing armed conflict (such as
civil war),” “[a]n environmental conflict (such as earthquake or
89

See generally Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2429-47.
Id. at 2435-38.
91
Id. at 2439.
92
Id. at 2447.
93
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018).
94
8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2019).
95
Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last updated
Jan. 17, 2020).
90
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hurricane), or an epidemic,” and “[o]ther extraordinary and temporary conditions.”96 Currently, that list includes El Salvador, Haiti,
Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria,
and Yemen.97 Consequently, TPS beneficiaries are not subject to removal from the United States, have work authorization, and may
obtain travel authorization.98 Moreover, such individuals are free
from detention based on their immigration status.99
Grants of TPS were common practice across party lines for almost two decades until the Trump Administration threatened to discontinue TPS for many beneficiaries.100 With expiration dates approaching, the Department of Homeland Security considered
whether to keep renewing TPS designations, which typically last anywhere from six to eighteen months.101 Despite estimates of a $6.9
billion drop in Social Security and Medicare contributions, Trump
Administration officials entertained the idea of discontinuing TPS
for Haiti, Honduras, and El Salvador.102 Threats to terminate TPS
designations also implicated a drain on public resources through the
loss of property taxes, home foreclosures, and revocation of employer-sponsored health insurance.103 Adding to the economic consequences of such a decision were social costs. As stated by Armando Carmona, a National TPS Alliance spokesperson, “‘[t]hese
are folks that have been in this country for years. Some have been
here for almost two decades They work here, they’ve built families here, they have U.S. citizen children.’”104
With the loss of TPS imminent, plaintiffs in California filed suit
in Ramos v. Nielson claiming discrimination as the motivating factor
96

Id.
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Nicole Acevedo, Immigration Protections for Some Extended as They
Fight Trump Admin. In Court, NBC NEWS (Nov. 1, 2019, 6:21 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/immigration-protections-some-extendedthey-fight-trump-admin-court-n1075291.
101
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behind DHS’s decision.105 Plaintiffs particularly relied upon alleged
evidence that the Secretary or Acting Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security acted under the guidance of the Trump Administration and President Trump’s animus toward non-white, nonEuropean foreign nationals.106 The Court found such evidence to be
dispositive of an equal protection violation, sharing that the DHS
Secretary or Acting Secretary was not required to “personally harbor
animus” if the president’s animus “influenced or manipulated their
decisionmaking process.”107
Ultimately, the consistency between DHS actions and the President’s immigration agenda sufficed for a preliminary showing of an
equal protection violation, and plaintiffs were granted an injunction
to continue extending protections.108 The Court first relied upon direct evidence of the President’s animus, including but not limited to:
calling Mexican immigrants “drug dealers or users, criminals, and
rapists”; implementing an absolute ban on Muslim immigration; asserting that all recent Haitian immigrants were AIDS carriers; alleging that recent Nigeran immigrants would “never go back to their
huts” in Africa; referencing TPS-designated countries—Haiti, El
Salvador, and African countries—as “shithole countries” and inviting greater immigration from Norway—a predominantly white
country—; and cautioning Europe of an impending culture change
from recent immigration patterns which he described as being “a
very negative thing for Europe.”109
Supplementing the direct evidence, the Court also found sufficient circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory motive.110 Such
evidence included: frequent exchanges between Chad Wolf, the
DHS Chief of Staff, and Stephen Miller, senior advisor to the president and strong advocate for terminating TPS; a recommendation by
the White House National Security Council to Acting DHS Secretary Elaine Duke to end TPS designations; and a discussion between
White House Chief of Staff John Kelly and Acting DHS Secretary
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Id. at 1098.
107 Id.
108
Id. at 1105.
109
Id. at 1100-01.
110
Id. at 1101.
106

146

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:131

Duke regarding TPS status for Central American countries. 111
Taken together, the court found enough evidence to believe that
DHS was “largely carrying out or conforming with a predetermined
presidential agenda to end TPS.”112
Just as promising was the Eastern District of New York’s ruling
in Saget v. Trump.113 Following the Northern District of California,
the Eastern District too found equal protection challenges meritorious for a preliminary injunction on termination of TPS for Haiti.114
Direct evidence of discriminatory animus exhibited toward nonwhite immigrants provided the basis for relief.115 Overall, the court
relied upon the same animus-ridden rhetoric cited in Ramos—particularly Haiti-specific comments such as Trump’s asking “‘[w]hy
are we having all these people from shithole countries come here?”
and his claim that Haitians “all have AIDS” in a meeting with former DHS Secretary Kelly.116 The Eastern District also turned to official discussions between the Oval Office and DHS reflecting an
intent to end TPS designations for predominantly non-white countries to lessen the number of non-white immigrants lawfully present
within the United States.117 Such conversations demonstrated “procedural and substantive departures from the established decisionmaking process.”118 DHS official Megan Westmoreland suggested as much, stating:
“We are concerned how [the Secretary] could find
Haiti to meet TPS conditions now but find in just a
few months from now that it no longer does. Do the
clients really believe conditions will improve over
the current baseline over the next 4-6 months? Could
extending now box [the Secretary] in for the next determination?”119
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Ultimately, the court relied on proof that “the [DHS] Secretary
was influenced by the White House and White House policy to ignore statutory guidelines, contort data, and disregard objective reason to reach a predetermined decision to terminate TPS and abate
the presence of non-white immigrants in the country.”120 The White
House’s influence was uncontested; rather, the government asserted
that the evidence only allowed for a presumption that termination
was predicated on countries no longer meeting statutory conditions
for TPS.121 However, for purposes of the court’s analysis, “[t]hat the
White House ‘led’ the decision to terminate is contrary to the statute
and indicates the White House heavily influenced DHS in the decision to terminate TPS.”122
Outcomes such as those in Ramos and Saget suggest a basis for
equal protection challenges founded upon Trump’s discriminatory
rhetoric and the influence of his presidential agenda on agencies.
II. A CASE FOR EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS IN THE
TEMPORARY HIATUS OF MEDICAL DEFERRED ACTION
A. Availability of Equal Protection Claims to Foreign Nationals
Whatever the labeling, discrimination based on race, national
origin, ancestry, or ethnicity stands in violation of equal protection
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.123 Equal protection guarantees,
as used against federal actors, can be found in the Fifth Amendment.124 The Due Process Clause provides that no person shall “be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ”125 In other words, the federal government and its agents
are obligated to treat individuals of like conditions and circumstances the same.126
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In its simplest form, once a claim is before a court, a bifurcated
test is applied.127 The first step begins by weighing the proffered
evidence of discrimination from federal action that allegedly harmed
the individual.128 The second step then looks to precedent to apply
the appropriate level of scrutiny for the type of discrimination alleged.129 At a minimum, a legal classification or distinction only
stands if it “neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect
class . . . so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate
end.”130
Notably, the clause does not refer to citizenship131— rather, it
refers to “person[s].”132 In general, the Constitution grants protections to individuals, regardless of legal status, with its amendments
delineating a series of negative rights limiting government action
over certain guaranteed freedoms.133 This pattern is only interrupted
by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”)134 and
by references to voting requirements or prerequisites for running for
office made in the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments.135
Here, however, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause136 (“[N]or shall any state . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”)137 lack any such

of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
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distinction in citizenship status. The Court in Plyer v. Doe confirmed
the significance of this lack of distinction.138
Faced with an equal protection challenge, the Court invalidated
a Texas law permitting the state to withhold funding from local
schools enrolling children of undocumented individuals.139 In reading the Equal Protection Clause, the Court found the operative
phrase to be “any person within the jurisdiction” of the State.140 According to the Court, “[w]hatever his status under the immigration
laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that
term.”141 If ever there was a need, the Court confirmed that an undocumented individual is indeed a person and then discussed
whether illegal presence in the United States rendered a person outside of the state’s jurisdiction.142 The Court’s answer: a resounding
no.143
Presence within a state’s boundaries was enough to consider a
person within the jurisdiction of the state.144 The Court elaborated
that, for purposes of equal protection, a person who is subject to the
state’s laws is sufficiently within its jurisdiction notwithstanding the
potential for that individual to be expelled for unlawful presence.145
Thereafter, the Court affirmed that equal protection applies to both
citizens and non-citizens of the United States.146 Later cases affirmed this idea, though it is worth noting the greater standard of due
process afforded to those who are legally present in the United States
as compared to those seeking admittance.147
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Acknowledging that non-citizens benefit from equal protection,
it is clear that, in the present case of medical deferred action, the
unequal treatment of immigrants seeking medical refuge in the
United States amounted to a violation of equal protection. Since Korematsu v. United States,148 laws rarely make explicit use of a suspect class—such as race—on their face, except in cases of affirmative action policies.149 If a suspect class were used, it would trigger
strict scrutiny by the courts.150 The facial neutrality of the decision
to revoke medical deferred action, however, does not leave the policy immune from challenge. In fact, it is still subject to an equal
protection claim, requiring a showing of both disparate impact and
discriminatory intent for strict scrutiny to apply.151
Indeed, on September 5, 2019, Irish International Immigrant
Center, Inc., sued agents of USCIS, DHS, and the president on behalf of thirty-three individuals and families representing nineteen
deferred action applications.152 Of the applicants in the nineteen
cases, six were Haitian, four were Dominican, five were Central and
South American, three were African, and one was European.153 The
complaint filed asserted that the change made by USCIS was “arbitrary, capricious, and based on impermissible animus [in] violat[ion]
[of] the [Adminsitrative Procedures Act] and the Equal Protection
guarantees of the U.S. Constitution.”154 The following sections aim
to provide an equal protection challenge by introducing arguments
for the existence of both disparate impact and discriminatory intent.
B.

Disparate Impact
Evidence of disparate impact is one of the elements required to
bring a successful equal protection challenge for a facially neutral
policy.155 The general impact in this case is clear. Immigrants in this
148
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country who were seeking reprieve from potential deportation for
access to medical care were subjected to possible deportation proceedings.156 With petitions numbered at approximately 1,000 applications that year, applicants gambled with the ability to securely
work and drive while they or their family members had serious medical needs addressed.157
Notwithstanding the number of submitted applications, what
made the impact disparate was the greater effect on some groups
over others. Disparate impact is found where a class of people is
disproportionately affected as compared to others similarly situated.158 This determination is fact-dependent and made on a caseby-case basis.159 Data from deferred action applications is not released by USCIS, and accordingly, it is difficult to give an estimate
of the national effect the program’s temporary revocation had.160
Nevertheless, sufficient anecdotal evidence exists to establish that
medical deferred action’s revocation targeted specific immigrants
disproportionately.161
For example, in the suit filed by Irish International Immigrant
Center, Inc., only one of the nineteen deferred action applicants represented was a European national.162 The other eighteen cases were
primarily from Latin America and the Caribbean, with three filed on
behalf of African nationals.163 Moreover, an overwhelming majority
of Irish International Immigrant Center clients seeking counsel for
deferred action are people of color from places in the Caribbean,
Central and South America, and Africa.164
Though a small sample size, the Irish International Immigrant
Center clients are largely representative of beneficiaries of a medical
deferred action grant.165 Medical deferred action recipients are
156
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generally individuals and their relatives with serious, chronic illnesses obtaining medical care otherwise unavailable in their native
country.166 Applicants who are successful in getting deferred action
frequently come from “low-resource countries with high child mortality and limited access to necessary therapies.”167
Though the nature of the request is to delay potential removal
proceedings from unlawful presence, many immigrants with grants
of medical deferred action enter the county legally on tourist visas,
seek medical care, and then submit an application for deferred status.168 Yet even the tourist visas on which they come, formally
known as B-2 visas, are being granted less and less.169 In 2017, approximately 6.4 million people entered the United States on a Bvisa.170 In 2018, that number dropped to 5,708,278 B-1 and B-2 visas granted.171 The B-2 visas, relevant here, are primarily used by
immigrants with medical deferred status to first gain admittance into
the country.172 According to the U.S. Department of State, B-visas
are nonimmigrant visas for tourism with temporary admittance
granted for purposes of “vacation, visit with friends or relatives,
[and more importantly for the purposes stated here] medical treatment ”173
The issue lies less with the overall reduced number of B-visas
granted, but concerns yet again the disproportionate impact on non166
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European immigrants. Compared to an overall refusal rate of 32.4%
in the 2018 fiscal year, African, Latin American, and Caribbean
countries consistently fared far worse.174 For example, Haiti was denied at a rate of 67.6%; Chad at a rate of 60.8%; Sierra Leone at a
rate of 60.6%; Honduras at a rate of 60.3%; Jamaica at a rate of
54.5%; and Guatemala at a rate of 53.6%.175 In contrast, European
countries fared much better. Toward the bottom of the list were
Liechtenstein at 0.0%; Poland at a rate of 4.0%; Luxembourg at a
rate of 5.2%; Austria at a rate of 5.4%; Switzerland at a rate of 5.5%;
and Iceland at a rate of 7.1%.
Moreover, B-visas limit stays to six months with extensions subject to approval by USCIS.176 Relative to the number of people
granted admittance, DHS reported the “rate of suspected overstays”
in 2018 as a mere 1.22%, or roughly 666,582 “overstay events.”177
For B-visas in particular, the number of overstays hovered at slightly
over 300,000 individuals at a rate of 2%.178 Despite the small number of visa overstay violators, the Trump Administration has set its
sights on prioritizing the deportation of the small few whose legal
visas have expired.179 Unsurprisingly, that prioritization has primarily impacted African countries under a policy of targeting the twenty
countries with an overstay rate of over ten percent (a number totaling less than 1,000 people in all but two of the countries).180 Djibouti, for instance, ranks as the country with the highest overstay
rate at 44.67%, but only amounts to 180 people; for Chad (the second highest), the 30.78% rate translated to 165 individuals, and for
Yemen (the third highest), the 28.52% rate translated to 518 individuals.181 Because the policy focuses on a country’s percentages
174
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rather than the raw number of individuals overstaying their visas,
the Trump Administration subsequently avoids targeting countries
such as Canada with 88,000 overstays.182
The final measure in ensuring a disparate impact from the start
of a medical deferred action petition is the automatic leniency in admittance to the United States granted by the Visa Waiver Program
(VWP). The program, “administered by the Department of Homeland Security in consultation with the State Department, permits citizens of 39 countries to travel to the United States for business or
tourism for stays of up to 90 days without a visa.”183 VWP is premised on reciprocity whereby U.S. citizens are allowed to travel to
these countries under similar parameters.184 The Latin American,
Caribbean, and African countries from which most of the medical
deferred action candidates come are absent.185 Instead, the program
includes predominantly white countries such as Australia, Belgium,
France, Germany, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom, among others.186 In other words, “[t]hey are
mostly rich nations in Europe and Asia.”187 Without the advantage
of being able to bypass the regular visa requirements for B-2 visas,188 nationals from Latin American, Caribbean, and African countries are given one less option to access—at a minimum—short-term
medical care in the United States.
In sum, the aforementioned evidence cumulatively demonstrate
disproportionate harm on non-European medical deferred action recipients. Those with deferred status are primarily immigrants from
Latin American, Caribbean, and African countries,189 the same ones
experiencing a decline in B-2 visas granting legal admission to immigrants seeking medical care in the United States and the same
ones lacking access to the Visa Waiver Program.190 Notably, in
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183
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conjunction with measures to limit access into the country, the
Trump Administration has implemented policies to disproportionately remove non-European nationals with expired visas.191 The
temporary cancellation of medical deferred action was yet another
tool used to fulfill campaign promises to prioritize deportation
(amidst racial-animus ridden rhetoric).192
C.

Discriminatory Intent
Operating in concert with the discriminatory impact evidenced
above is a discriminatory intent to deport non-European immigrants.
Similar to disparate impact, discriminatory intent need not be explicit in its motive.193 Even a facially neutral statute may be invalidated if its application is invidiously discriminatory.194 The Court
has made clear that the standard is not that “the necessary discriminatory racial purpose must be express or appear on the face of the
statute, or that a law’s disproportionate impact is irrelevant
”195
Rather, “an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred
from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true,
that the law bears more heavily on one race than another.”196 Discriminatory intent can be inferred from extreme disparate impact.197
However, in the absence of an extreme effect on one group, impact alone will not be held as dispositive.198 Rather, the Court must
look at the amalgamation of impact and other factors.199 It is an inquiry of direct and circumstantial evidence considering such things
as events leading up to the policy, legislative or administrative history, and remarks made by those in the decisionmaking body.200
191

See Sacchetti, supra note 178.

192 Id.
193

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Id. at 241-42.
195
Id. at 241.
196
Id. at 242.
197
See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960) (“What the Court
has said in those cases is equally applicable here, viz., that ‘Acts generally lawful
may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end, and a constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an unconstitutional result.’”) (internal citations omitted).
198
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977).
199 Id.
200
Id. at 267-68.
194

156

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:131

Though the courts rely upon the government’s purported rationale
behind policy changes in making its determinations in equal protection challenges, that deference is not absolute.201 To the contrary:
[r]arely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a
decision motivated solely by a single concern, or
even that a particular purpose was the “dominant” or
“primary” one. In fact, it is because legislators and
administrators are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations that courts
refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions,
absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. But
racial discrimination is not just another competing
consideration. When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the
decision, this judicial deference [to the government’s
decision] is no longer justified.202
More recently, courts have adopted this standard in analyzing
administrative bodies’ decisions to terminate immigration programs
that assist predominantly non-white foreign nationals.203 In the face
of threatened termination of TPS, plaintiffs brought suit claiming
discrimination as the primary driving factor behind the administrative decision to end Temporary Protective Status.204 Of particular
relevance was the plaintiffs’ alleged proof that decisions by the Secretary or Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
were guided by the desires of the Trump Administration and that
President Trump exhibited explicit animus toward non-white, nonEuropean foreign nationals.205 The Court addressed the significance
of this evidence, stating that “even if the DHS Secretary or Acting
Secretary did not ‘personally harbor animus . . . , their actions may
violate the equal protection guarantee if President Trump’s alleged
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animus influenced or manipulated their decisionmaking process.’”206
In light of the consistency between DHS actions and the President’s immigration agenda, the Court found sufficient evidence to
indicate a potential equal protection violation.207 The direct evidence of the President’s animus was found in abundance and was
limited to a non-exhaustive list of comments.208 Such remarks included: describing Mexican immigrants as “drug dealers or users,
criminals, and rapists”; calling for an absolute ban on Muslim immigration; claiming that recent Haitian immigrants were all carriers
of AIDS; asserting that recent Nigeran immigrants would “never go
back to their huts” in Africa; referring to TPS designated countries—Haiti, El Salvador, and African countries—as “shithole countries” and requesting greater immigration from Norway—a predominantly white country—; and warning Europe of an impending culture change from recent immigration patterns which he described as
being “a very negative thing for Europe.”209
Notwithstanding the direct evidence, the Court found that the
circumstantial evidence would suffice.210 Such proof included: frequent contact between Chad Wolf, the DHS Chief of Staff, and Stephen Miller, senior advisor to the president and strong proponent for
terminating TPS; a recommendation by the White House National
Security Council to Acting DHS Secretary Duke to end TPS designations; and a discussion between White House Chief of Staff Kelly
and Acting DHS Secretary Duke regarding TPS status for Central
American countries.211 Given the sequence and timing of these
events, the Court determined that there was enough evidence to presume that DHS was “largely carrying out or conforming with a predetermined presidential agenda to end TPS.”212
Largely pertinent to the present analysis is not only the discriminatory remarks evidenced by the Trump Administration, but also
the applicable standard of review for such a case. Trump v. Hawaii
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207
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announced a rational basis standard of review in analyzing a challenge to the enforcement of President Trump’s Presidential Proclamation banning entry of Muslim foreign nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries.213 However, absent considerations of “the
entry of aliens from outside the United States, express national security concerns[,] and active involvement of foreign policy,”214 federal district courts in Ramos and Centro Presente found the appropriate standard to be strict scrutiny.215 In other words, the law or
policy must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling government
interest.216
The instant case of revoking medical deferred action more
clearly resembles that of Ramos and Centro Presente, where:
(1) there was no indication that national security or
foreign policy was a reason to terminate [medical deferred action]; (2) . . . the [medical deferred action
beneficiaries] are already in the United States and aliens within the United States have greater constitutional protections than those outside who are seeking
admission for the first time; and (3) the executive order in Trump [v. Hawaii] was issued pursuant to a
very broad grant of statutory discretion whereas Congress has not given the Secretary carte blanche to
terminate [medical deferred action] for any reason
whatsoever.217
Because Trump v. Hawaii did not concern an equal protection
challenge to removing immigration status or benefit from those legally present in the United States, it is inapplicable.218 Thus, upon a
finding of discriminatory intent—all the more likely given the influence of President Trump’s racially inflammatory remarks—the
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policy of terminating medical deferred action would likely be subject to a strict scrutiny standard of review.
It need not be assumed that the remarks made by President
Trump would serve as a basis for the presence of discriminatory intent behind the termination of medical deferred action. The Complaint in the medical deferred action suit against agents of USCIS,
DHS, and the President says as much.219 Paragraph 4 of the Introduction to the Complaint explicitly names the President’s actions
and words as the predicate for his administration’s agenda against
immigrants of color.220 More importantly, the Complaint details
how President Trump’s sentiments are not an outlier.221 It references
statements made by Acting Director of USCIS, Kenneth Cuccinelli,
equating immigrants to “invaders.”222 More telling is the next allegation: that “just days before USCIS began sending denial letters to
people seeking deferred action, [Cuccinelli stated] that the Statue of
Liberty’s famous exhortation to ‘give me your tired, your poor’ refers to ‘people coming from Europe ’”223
Much of the direct evidence of racial or national origin animus
can be supplemented by circumstantial evidence of discriminatory
motive. Cloaked in facially neutral language, the cited rationales behind terminating medical deferred action relied on the premise that
such a termination would curb illegal immigrants’ leeching of U.S.
resources.224 For example, Cuccinelli falsely asserted that medical
deferred action beneficiaries generally entered the United States illegally; but in reality, beneficiaries enter on tourist visas, inquire
into the availability of healthcare, and then apply for lawful status
under medical deferred action.225 Though Cuccinelli protested such
allegations, his acts of misinformation led Congresswoman Debbie
Wasserman Shultz to reproach Cuccinelli and President Trump of
following a “white supremacist ideology” by enacting policies
greatly affecting immigrants of color.226
219
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Referring cases to ICE also heavily implicated a desire for removal over a genuine reform in the assessment of medical deferral
applications. Though claiming that the termination was an effort to
“focus agency resources on faithfully administering our nation’s
lawful immigration system,” USCIS shifted the burden onto ICE—
”the DHS component agency responsible for removing individuals
from the United States.”227 Legislators protested this move as a
means of stoking the fears of undocumented immigrants.228 In a letter to DHS, legislators lambasted DHS for its renunciation of a
longstanding practice to review deferred action applications; in particular, they argued that “[r]equiring . . . prospective applicants [to]
request this humanitarian relief by applying to an immigration enforcement agency that detains and deports hundreds of thousands of
immigrants annually, will deter many vulnerable children and families from coming forward and seeking life-saving protection ”229
As suggested, there was no evidence of abuse by applicants of
medical deferred action. According to immigration attorney Tammy
Fox-Isicoff, “[t]hese cases aren’t our meat and potatoes, they are our
Hail Marys It’s like the administration is stripping every ounce
of immigration policy that’s merciful or human.”230 Sudden revocation of a “small but necessary” program is further suggestive of an
underlying ulterior motive.231
Additional circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent can
be found in the events leading to the program’s reinstatement. In
particular, USCIS was reluctant to grant testimony or produce evidence after repeated requests from Congress.232 Instead, USCIS
227

Madan, supra note 36.
Camilo Montoya-Galvez, More than 100 Lawmakers Denounce Decision
to End Program for Sick Immigrants, CBS NEWS (Aug. 30, 2019, 4:18 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/medical-deferred-action-more-than-100-lawmakers-decry-decision-to-stop-health-program-for-sick-immigrants/.
229
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
230
Madan, supra note 36.
231
See id.
232
Memorandum from Elijah E. Cummings, Chairman of the House Comm.
on Oversight and Reform, House of Rep., to Members of the Comm. on Oversight
and
Reform
(Oct.
10,
2019),
https://d279m997dpfwgl.cloudfront.net/wp/2019/10/2019-10-10.-COR-Memo-on-Subpoena-for-DHS-re.Deporting-Critically-Ill-Children.pdf.
228

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

161

defended its stonewalling by claiming protection due to ongoing litigation and deliberative process privilege.233 Limited cooperation
coupled with USCIS’s insistence that Congress dwells on “a resolved issue”234 led to Representative Elijah Cummings issuing a
notice of intent to subpoena Acting Directors for USCIS and ICE.235
Congresswoman Ayanna Pressley commented:
There will not be full justice and full restoration for
these families until they have received notification . . . . We understand what the genesis was for
this because we see what happens in the light of day
with this administration, one shudders to think what
is happening under the cloak of night.236
As found in Ramos, the influence of President Trump’s rhetoric
on administrative decisionmaking is sufficiently determinative of an
animus-based motive.237 After some congressional pressure, on October 30, 2019, USCIS Acting Director Ken Cuccinelli testified before members of the House Oversight Committee that it was his decision alone to revoke the program.238 Taken as true, Cuccinelli’s
actions still reflect in accordance with the Trump Administration’s
agenda. From Congresswoman Pressley’s questioning of Cuccinelli,
it was evident that she suspected the involvement of President
Trump or his senior advisor Stephen Miller in the decision to terminate medical deferred action.239 And yet Cuccinelli took the hit: he
both acknowledged the resulting confusion of USCIS’s decision and
stood firmly behind the premise that the program lacks a legal or
regulatory basis, inviting Congress to introduce legislation to implement any desired changes.240
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Ultimately, nothing operates in a vacuum. In light of other administrative practices—such as family separation, mass deportation,
and limited healthcare provisions in detention centers—there is little
to offset the impression that the termination of medical deferred action was an extension of President Trump fulfilling his divisive campaign agenda.241 In sum,
[a]ccelerating policy announcements targeting documented and undocumented immigrants leave little
doubt that eliminating medical deferred action, and
thereby breaking physician–patient relationships and
causing avoidable deaths, was a symbolic gesture. It
signifies to the public that these patients’ lives are not
worth saving. It signifies to the patients that they are
at the mercy of an inscrutable government agency
that can suddenly and without explanation issue a
death sentence.242
IV.
EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
The applicable standard of review for the revocation of medical
deferred action is strict scrutiny.243 Though supporters of its termination would articulate a rational basis standard of review per Trump
v. Hawaii, such a standard is best limited to cases concerning national security and foreign nationals seeking admittance into the
country who are not currently present within U.S. borders.244 Absent
considerations of “the entry of aliens from outside the United States,
express national security concerns[,] and active involvement of foreign policy,”245 federal courts considering whether the termination
of medical deferred action violated equal protection should
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determine if such a change in policy was narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.246
With litigation ongoing, the best indicator of the government’s
proffered interest in ending medical deferred action comes from the
principal actors in its termination. According to USCIS Acting Director Ken Cuccinelli, medical deferred action—a program with
decades-long use—lacks any legal or regulatory basis and is subject
to revocation at any given moment.247 Specifically, Cuccinelli took
the stance that instituting enduring immigration relief, such as that
provided by medical deferred action, is the province of Congress.248
The cited rationale for termination resembled this line of thinking—
namely, that the program’s revocation was an effort to “focus
agency resources on faithfully administering our nation’s lawful immigration system.”249
Notwithstanding the facially-neutral interest offered, circumstantial evidence of an animus-driven interest can be inferred from
“[t]he impact of the official action – whether it bears more heavily
on one race than another;” “[t]he historical background of the decision” and “[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision;” and “[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence.”250 In isolation, Cuccinelli’s reasoning is a little suspect.
However, in conjunction with the Muslim ban, the attempted termination of TPS, and the inflammatory rhetoric given on the campaign
trail and within the Oval Office, the proffered rationale appears pretextual. Given the sequence and timing of these events, there is
enough evidence to presume that USCIS was “largely carrying out
or conforming with a predetermined presidential agenda”251 to end
medical deferred action—a basis for which courts can find an equal
protection violation.252
The termination of medical deferred action signaled a sudden
shift from common practice to fulfill campaign promises of the new
administration. Consequently, Cuccinelli’s tendered explanation is
See generally Strict Scrutiny, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
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unconvincing. Even if taken as true, however, courts have dismissed
administrative convenience as satisfying a standard of strict scrutiny.253 More telling, Cuccinelli never provides evidence that the
elimination of medical deferred action would help the agency better
allocate resources. Rather, evidence shows that USCIS receives a
mere 1,000 applications per year.254 As such, there is little to suggest
that many resources are being misappropriated for this “small but
necessary” program.255
An animus-driven motive will never pass strict scrutiny.256 But
even in regard to tailoring, Cuccinelli’s argument for adjusting the
focus of USCIS for administrative ease seems both overinclusive
and underinclusive. If the concern were with the misuse of resources
and an abuse of the immigration system, little sense can be made of
eliminating a program for which (1) the majority of its beneficiaries
enter legally on a B-visa,257 and (2) there is a small rate of overstay
events among its applicants.258 Specifically, for B-visa holders, the
number of overstays hovers at slightly over 300,000 individuals at a
rate of 2%.259 Rather than showing concern for administrative relief,
the shift in review of medical deferred action applications to ICE
demonstrated a prioritization of deportation despite the small number of visa overstay violators.260
This prioritization has been myopic in scope, primarily impacting non-European immigrants of color.261 A focus on a country’s
percentages of overstays rather than the raw number of individuals
overstaying their visas has permitted the Trump Administration to
avoid targeting countries such as Canada with 88,000 overstays. 262
In other words, a claim for resource conservation fails due to
253
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underinclusiveness if overstays from Western nations remain untargeted.263 Pertinent here is the fact that medical deferred action recipients are generally individuals and their relatives with serious,
chronic illnesses obtaining medical care otherwise unavailable in
their native country.264 Beneficiaries frequently come from “low-resource countries with high child mortality and limited access to necessary therapies,”265 and consequently, a move to eliminate a small
stream of immigration for life-saving treatment appears overinclusive under a purported rationale of conserving resources.
More revealing is the minimal number of immigrants seeking
medical assistance.266 There is neither a strain nor an abuse of the
system to warrant such a response from the government. Rather, it
is tantamount to a death sentence and reflects a disregard for human
life that does not bear U.S. citizenship. In Ramos, the court distinguished the disruption and hardship created by the removal of TPS
beneficiaries from the lack of real harm to the public interest if the
status quo were to remain.267 Though similar, the instant case presents greater consequences—rather than a loss of livelihood, the cost
is the loss of life.
Courts have acknowledged that foreign nationals with lawful
presence within the United States are granted a greater level of due
process as compared to those not already within the nation’s borders.268 Moreover, it has been noted that “[a]lthough their stay is
temporary in nature, the shortening of their time in the United States
and acceleration of their removal if relief is not granted may constitute irreparable injury.”269 Though the Supreme Court upheld the
Muslim travel ban,270 the Court’s 5-4 split leaves potential for this
case to turn on whether there was neutral intent behind the decision
as opposed to whether there was potential presidential abuse of delegated authority. Given the lack of national security concerns and
263
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the lawful presence of medical deferred action beneficiaries, 271
courts should follow the standard set in Arlington and decline to extend deference to an administrative policy motivated by a discriminatory purpose.272
Notwithstanding how the courts should rule, Cuccinelli was correct in one regard: medical deferred action can be permanently secured by the passage of new legislation rather than relying on the
decades-long precedent of using the program through prosecutorial
discretion.273 Instead of seeking permanence by relying on the
courts, medical deferred action may best be safeguarded through
congressional reform. The ease with which medical deferred action
beneficiaries’ lives were put in jeopardy demonstrates the need for
stability in receiving life-saving treatment.
V.

CONCLUSION

Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand
A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name
Mother of Exiles . . . .
“Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”274
The recent state of immigration policy for those seeking medical
deferred action displays a blatant disregard for the words engraved
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on the pedestal of the Statute of Liberty. Contrary to our Constitution—written primarily with the guaranteed rights of persons in
mind—the Trump Administration has seemingly operated with an
agenda to limit the rights of foreign nationals within our borders. In
conjunction with the Muslim ban and attempts to end TPS designations, the temporary hiatus of medical deferred action review implicated a discriminatory motive to reduce the presence of non-white,
non-European immigrants in the United States. The stakes were
high. With ICE left at the helm of reviewing applications, deportation was likely and death imminent.
Reinstitution of USCIS’s review, though promising, still leaves
new and returning applicants in a state of duress and confusion as a
backlog of applications are awaiting approval. Without congressional action, medical deferred action remains impermanent. Despite the bleak outcome, there is a silver lining: foreign nationals
have equal protection rights. Moreover, any deprivation of such
rights resulting in a disparate impact and premised in a discriminatory intent may be challenged in court.

